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STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR APPEAL 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, pursuant to 
Article 8 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, §78-2-2(3)(I) and 
§78-2a-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and Rule 3 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal involves matters of first impression for the court. 
It requests that the court interpret §2301 et seq, of the United States 
Code, commonly known as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and, §70A-2-719, 
Utah Code Annotated as it affects new car limited warranties under the 
Magnuson-Moss Act. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third District Court 
below, granting the respondent partial summary judgment; denying the 
plaintiff any amount of money incidental and consequential damages; 
and, a judgment awarding the plaintiff the substantially discounted sum 
of $10,000.00 in attorneyfs fees as opposed to the requested attorney's 
fees in the amount of over $44,069.15. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW COMMIT ERROR OF 
LAW IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING APPELLANT 
ANY RECOVERY ON HIS CAUSES OF ACTION FOR 
INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES? 
DID THE LOWER COURT COMMIT ERROR OF LAW IN 
MAKING FINDINGS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS 
DECISION TO AWARD THE APPELLANT LESS THAN 
HIS FULL CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES? 
DID THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE CREDIBLE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TIME OF TRIAL 
SUPPORT A DECISION BY THE COURT BELOW TO 
DISCOUNT THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARD? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant purchased a 1982 BMW 320i motor vehicle from the 
defendant, BMW of Murray, in February, 1982. Appellant immediately 
began experiencing difficulty with the vehicle and returned it for 
repair to the original dealer a number of times, then to another dealer 
a number of times. Having had many opportunities to repair the vehicle 
(approximately 10 times), the dealer was either unable or unwilling to 
repair the defects. 
The appellant was then authorized by agents of the manufacturer, 
BMW of North America, to take the vehicle to another BMW dealer in the 
Greater Salt Lake area. Appellant took the car to Clark-Buick-Datsun-
GMC-BMW ("Clark") to have the defects repaired. The Clark dealership, 
again, was either unable or unwilling to repair the defects, having 
also had the vehicle brought to them on approximately 10 occasions 
providing them an opportunity to do so. 
Defendants having failed to repair the defects in the vehicle, 
the appellant filed an action against the respondents, stating, among 
other things, causes of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 
Appellant's complaint was filed in the Third District Court. 
As part of its Magnuson-Moss "Lemon Law" causes of action, the 
appellant requested incidental and consequential damages as are 
provided for under the Uniform Commercial Code and incorporated by 
Magnuson-Moss. Appellant further requested his attorneyfs fees and 
costs of court, statutorily provided for in Magnuson-Moss. 
A few days before trial, respondents made a motion for partial 
summary judgment, requesting that the court dismiss appellant's cause 
of action for incidental and consequential damages. The defendant's 
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theory was these damages were not available to the appellant as a 
matter of law. The court took the respondent's motion under 
advisement. 
Trial in this matter commenced on August 1st, 1988 and was 
completed the afternoon of August 2nd, 1988. A jury was impaneled 
during the morning of the first day. Hugh Schurtz was sworn as 
plaintiff's first witness, and testified concerning the problems he had 
with the car during the first afternoon. The morning of the second day 
of trial, counsel made additional arguments to the court in chambers 
concerning the pending motion for partial summary judgment. The court 
then took the bench and announced that it had decided respondent's 
motion for partial summary judgment in favor of respondent. The court 
informed Mr* Schurtz that he would be barred from presenting evidence 
with regard to his incidental and consequential damages. 
The defendants then offered, and both parties agreed, that 
the subject motor vehicle could be returned to the dealer by the 
plaintiff for the purchase price, minus a credit for miles driven. 
This agreement was entered into by Mr. Schurtz in lieu of presenting 
his evidence on the breach and revocation issues, in return for an 
agreement from defendants that he could be deemed the prevailing party 
for purposes of the court's consideration of attorney's fees. This was 
important because Magnuson-Moss only provided for "prevailing party" 
attorneys fees. The appellant was unwilling to forego presenting his 
evidence on the breach and revocation issues without the concession 
from the defendant that plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party 
for purposes of attorney's fees. The defendants so conceded. 
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The issues of breech of warranty, revocation of acceptance, and 
prevailing party having been disposed of by stipulation, and the court 
having previously granted partial summary judgment against plaintiff 
as to incidental and consequential damages, all that was left was 
issue of plaintiff's attorneyfs fees. After testimony for one-half of 
one day concerning fees, the court took the matter under advisement. 
Later, in its memorandum decision, the court awarded appellant 
$10,000.00 in attorney's fees. Appellant's actual attorney's fees 
expended, as supported by testimony given at the time of trial, were 
in the amount of $44,069.15. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I; The defendant BMW gave Hugh Schurtz a limited written 
warranty on the new BMW he purchased from them in 1983. The "limited" 
warranty stated that Mr. Schurtz would have no implied warranties of 
merchantability or fitness for particular use. It also provided that 
the plaintiff would have no recovery for his incidental or 
consequential damages, but only the limited remedy provided. The 
limited warranty given provided that the seller would repair or replace 
defects in materials and workmanship only. 
Utah Code Annotated, §70A-2-719(2) provides that "where 
circumstances cause a limited warranty to fail in its essential 
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this act". This refers to 
the incidental and consequential damage remedies of Utah Code 
Annotated, §70A-2-715. In this case, the essential purpose of the 
limited warranty was to provide Mr. Schurtz a car to enjoy and drive. 
The defendants failure to repair or replace defects in the car which 
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impaired Mr. Schurtz's ability to enjoy or drive the car. At this 
point, the limited warranty had failed in its essential purpose. 
After one-half day of uncontroverted testimony by plaintiff-
appellant, to the effect that respondent utterly failed or refused to 
replace or repair the sustained defects in his car, the lower court 
granted partial summary judgment against plaintiff, stating that he was 
not entitled to incidental and consequential damages as a matter of 
law. 
Judge Noel's decision is clearly is contrary to the case law 
interpreting §70A-2-719(2) as augmented by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act. 
ISSUE II: In this case, as in many of the Magnuson-Moss cases 
concerning new car warranties, the plaintiff's attorney's fees exceeded 
the value of the car by the time of trial. Plaintiff's claim for 
attorney's fees was $44,069.15. The attorney's fees issue was not only 
a material issue as described in the Boyer and LeGrand Johnson cases, 
but the most important issue decided. 
The court's published findings based on its minute entry are 
circular and lacking in detail. The findings do not tell whose fault 
the failure to settle was. The findings do not say where, when, or 
based upon what event the case should have settled. The findings imply 
that the case should have settled when plaintiff's attorneys' fees 
totaled the sum of $10,000.00. The findings do not state when that 
was, or how it determined that the plaintiff's attorney's fees were 
ten thousand dollars at any given point in time. 
ISSUE III: The court's finding that the case could have or 
should have settled earlier when the plaintiff's attorney's fees were 
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only $10,000 is unsupported by the record. In this case, the record 
shows only that the hours spent by plaintiff's counsel were reasonably 
necessary to its prosecution, that $90.00 per hour was a reasonable 
rate for both of plaintiff's counsel to charge, and that the plaintiff 
wanted to settle the case all along. 
The record shows that the parties were not close in their 
attempts to settle at any time. The record also shows that the parties 
thought they had settled at one point, but that the plaintiff did not 
understand or authorize the settlement. The record on fees, taken as 
a whole, paints a picture indicating that the defendants, from the 
outset, wanted to settle the case on simple recision, paying a minimal 
amount or nothing for attorney's fees and incidental and consequential 
damages. The plaintiff, on the other hand, believed in his cause of 
action and that he was entitled to revoke acceptance of the car, his 
incidental and consequential damages, and his attorney's fees. 
The record does not identify or even suggest any episode, event, 
or offer made by either side which plaintiff should have accepted, or 
which should have caused him to settle. Nothing in the transcript 
concerning fees explains the district court's discounting the award of 
attorney's fees, even if taken in a light most favorable to the lower 
court. 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW COMMIT ERROR OF 
LAW IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING APPELLANT ANY 
RECOVERY ON HIS CAUSES OF ACTION FOR INCIDENTAL 
AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES? 
The parties agreed at trial that they were in dispute over 
material facts concerning the incidental and consequential damages 
issue. Judge Noel ruled that the appellant was not entitled to these 
damages as a matter of law. Mr. Schurtz was entitled to consequential 
and incidental damages; therefore, the trial court erred in granting 
partial summary judgment. 
Mr. Schurtz had purchased a new 1982 BMW motor car from the 
defendant, BMW of Murray. The vehicle came with a written new car 
limited warranty. 
The Magnuson-Moss Consumer Products Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301 
et seq, (the "Act") provides federal minimum standards for consumer 
product warranties of two types: 1) "full warranties"; and, 2) 
"limited warranties". This case does not involve a full warranty, 
therefore, this brief will not discuss full warranties. Concerning 
limited warranties, however, the Act eliminates a supplier's ability 
to disclaim or modify implied warranties such as the warranties of 
merchantability or fitness for a particular use. 15 U.S.C. 2308(a)(b) 
Any disclaimer, modification or limitation, other than for the duration 
of implied warranties is "ineffective for purposes of [the Act] and 
state law". 11 U.S.C. 2308fc) 
The effect of the Act is to encompass many UCC provisions and 
to expand the applicability of those provisions by preventing 
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disclaimer, modification or limitation of the UCC in cases where a 
written warranty (in this case, a limited written warranty) exists. 
In order to effectively raise a cause of action under the Act, it is, 
therefore, necessary to rely on and plead elements which appear to be 
UCC implied warranty claims. 
It is possible for a cause of action for breach of warranty 
under the Act to be separate and independent from a cause of action for 
breach of an express warranty under the UCC. The difference between 
an action under the Act and a similar action under the UCC lies in the 
expanded interpretation given to UCC provisions under the Act. The Act 
expands the UCC and expressly overrides much of the case law limiting 
UCC remedies. 
Utah Code Annotated, §70a-2-719(2), 1953 as amended, provides: 
Where circumstances cause an exclusive or 
limited remedy to fail of its essential 
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this 
act. 
This provision gives appellant, upon failure of either (1) an exclusive 
remedy; or, (2) a limited remedy, all of the remedies provided in the 
U.C.C., including the incidental and consequential damages as described 
in Utah Code Annotated, §70A-2-715, not "other remedies". 
Under the limited warranty provisions provided by BMW to the 
plaintiff, there is a limitation which eliminated implied warranties 
and permits no recovery of incidental and consequential damages. This 
makes the remaining warranty to repair or replace an exclusive as well 
as a limited remedy. As argued before the district court below, if the 
dealer and manufacturer are unable to "repair or replace" to cure the 
defects, the exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose. If, as 
argued by respondents, the effect of §70A~2-719(2) does not restore a 
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buyer1s right to claim incidental and consequential damages, then the 
remedy which is restored is the very one which has failed, leaving the 
buyer with no remedy at all. The factual dispute as to whether or not 
Mr. Schurtz had given the defendants adequate opportunity to repair or 
replace the vehicle in twenty attempts to do so was never decided. 
Judge Noel granted partial summary judgment as a matter of law, half-
way through plaintifffs testimony. 
The purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, as it applies to 
new car purchases, is to expand the applicability of U.C.C. provisions 
by preventing disclaimer, modification or limitation of the U.C.C. in 
cases where a written warranty exists. Cases under the Magnuson-Moss 
Act provide for wide ranging damages for breach of warranty and for 
recovery of litigation costs, including attorney's fees. The cases 
under Magnuson-Moss have been generous in awarding a broad range of 
incidental and consequential damages. Orange Motors v. Dade County 
Dairies. Inc., 258 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1979); Arnold v. Ford Motor Co., 
566 P.2d 98 (N.M. 1977)(award of purely economic losses); McGregor v. 
Dimou, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1979)(economic losses awarded); Bolens v. 
Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058 (5th Circ. 1984)(award of damages for 
lost investment and for costs of finding alternative housing); Givan 
v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243 (Mo.App. 1978)(buyer awarded out-
of-pocket expenses, including hotel bill); B&M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 
376 So.2d 667 (Ala. 1979)(buyer's damage award included damages for 
mental anguish); Lemaldi v. DeTomasco of America. Inc.. 383 A.2d 1220 
(N.J. 1978)(another mental anguish award); McGrady v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp.. 360 N.E.2d 818 (Ill.App. 1977)(damages awarded for 
inconvenience, aggravation and loss of use); Coyle Chevrolet v. 
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Carrier, 397 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind.App. 1979)(damages awarded of sales tax 
and finance charges); Jacobs v. Rosemont Dodge-Winnebago South. 310 
N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981)(damages for costs of substitute transportation); 
Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978)(damages or 
loss of use); McGinnis v. Wentworth Chevrolet Co., 645 P.2d 543 
(Or.App. 1982)(award of incidental costs, including storage expenses, 
interest on loan financing and provision of substitute transportation) . 
All of the above cases deal with application of Magnuson-Moss 
Act and the U.C.C. to warranties for motor vehicles. The cases cited 
by the defendant in their motion for summary judgment and which 
appellant anticipates will be cited in defendants brief, are 
distinguishable in that thev do not deal with warranties for motor 
vehicles under Magnuson-Moss. 
The Uniform Commercial Code, §2-719, Official Comment, states 
in part: 
Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit 
the remedial provisions of this Article in an 
unconscionable manner is subject to deletion 
and in that event the remedies made available 
by this Article are applicable as if the 
stricken clause never existed. Similarly, 
under subsection (2), where an apparently fair 
and reasonable clause because of circumstances 
fails in its essential purpose or operates to 
deprive either party of the substantial value 
of the bargain, it must give way to the general 
remedy provisions of this Article. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The incidental and consequential damage provisions of U.C.C. §2-715 are 
reinstated if either (1) the limitation is unconscionable; or (2) the 
warranty fails in its essential purpose or deprives either party of the 
substantial value of the bargain. 
This restoration of "general remedy provisions" applies to all 
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of the U.C.C. damage provisions. Osburn v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc. 
613 P.2d 445 (Okla. 1980). This includes the right to recover 
consequential damages. Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 
513, 525 (Wis. 1978). The Ohio supreme court held that an automobile 
buyer may recover consequential damages when the seller has breached 
an express warranty, even though the warranty denies recovery of those 
damages. Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 396 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio 1979). 
If the limitation on incidental and consequential damages is 
permitted to stand where the warranty otherwise fails of its essential 
purpose, the buyer is restored only to the remedy which has already 
failed, i.e., to repair or replace. The buyer, therefore, becomes 
locked into a circle binding him to the exclusive remedy which is no 
remedy. This cannot reasonably be assumed to be the intent of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, nor does it agree with the underlying purposes 
of the Magnuson-Moss Act. 
The only reasonable interpretation of Utah Code Annotated, §70A-
2-719 is that where the buyer has been deprived of the benefits of his 
exclusive or limited remedy, he is entitled to all of the other 
remedies available under the U.C.C. These include incidental and 
consequential damages. Therefore, the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on the question of incidental and consequential 
damages. 
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ISSUE II 
DID THE LOWER COURT COMMIT ERROR OF LAW IN 
MAKING FINDINGS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS 
DECISION TO AWARD THE APPELLANT LESS THAN HIS 
FULL CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES? 
At the end of the presentation of evidence at trial, Judge Frank 
Noel took the issue concerning attorney's fees under advisement. 
Subsequently, the court rendered its decision in memorandum form via 
minute entry dated August 9th, 1988 (Addendum E.) The court's findings 
were adopted virtually verbatim into the written findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order prepared for the court, which it later 
signed. The court's findings were as follows: 
"The court having taken under advisement the 
issue of attorney's fees after testimony and 
oral argument, now rules as follows: After 
reviewing the evidence in this matter the court 
is of the opinion that this case could have and 
probably should have been settled very early 
in the proceedings, for an amount roughly equal 
to the ultimate outcome. The court is, 
therefore, not persuaded to grant [plaintiff] 
all [attorney's] fees claimed but will make a 
substantial discount based on what the court 
feels is reasonable under the circumstances and 
will award [plaintiff] $10,000 in attorney's 
fees." 
The court's finding, as outlined above, is insufficient and does not 
meet the requirements of Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 52 requires that "the court shall find the facts specially". The 
case law interpreting Rule 52, requires that "the trial judge in 
contested cases find facts on all of the material issues, and that to 
fail to do so is reversible error". Bover Co. v. Licrnell. 567 P.2d 1112 
(Utah 1977) and LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson. 420 P.2d 615 (1966). 
This case was vigorously defended. Mr. Schurtz was deposed on 
three separate days, and his deposition consists of four volumes. 
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Additionally, multiple sets of interrogatories and requests for the 
production of documents were sent by defendants. By the time the 
matter came to trial, as is the case in many Magnuson-Moss cases, the 
attorney's fees of the plaintiff were far in excess of the value of the 
vehicle involved. Universal Motors. Inc. v. Waldock 719 P.2d 254 
(Alaska 1986) [$20,000.00 for the car, $65,000.00 for expert witness 
fees, $36,526 in attorneys fees] and under an act similar to Magnuson-
Moss in Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc.. 578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1978) 
[attorney's fees in the amount of $14,000.00 we awarded where damages 
amounted to only $3,690.00] 
The vehicle Mr. Schurtz bought had a purchase price of 
$14,500.00. His incidental and consequential claim was for 
approximately $15,000.00. By the time the matter got to trial, Mr. 
Schurtz had accumulated attorney's fees in the amount of $44,069.15. 
Attorney's fees, therefore, became a substantial issue. 
The finding made by Judge Noel tells this court nothing about 
what specific evidence he found to be credible. The finding says that 
$10,000.00 in attorney's fees is "reasonable under the circumstances", 
but does not say what the court found to be the circumstances. It 
states that the court's opinion is that the case "could have and 
probably should have been settled very early in the proceedings", but 
does not state why, when or for what amount. The finding is circular. 
Without stating why the case should have settled or when, or that it 
was the fault of the plaintiff that it had failed to settle, Judge Noel 
says that case should have settled for an amount roughly equal to the 
ultimate outcome. Because the court awarded a discounted amount in 
attorney's fees in the sum of $10,000.00, one can only assume that the 
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court believed that the matter should have settled when the plaintifffs 
attorney's fees equaled $10,000.00. The finding does not identify when 
that was, or what episode, event or offer of settlement was made which 
should have terminated the case. There is no finding that a settlement 
offer was ever made by either side, or why it should have been 
accepted. Undisputed testimony at the time of trial was that only one 
settlement offer was ever made with enough detail and authority that 
the other side could have accepted it. This settlement offer was the 
subject of a motion by defendants to enforce, which the court denied. 
(See Addendum D.) 
The court fails to identify any other event, chain of events, 
attitude or behavior which prevented the case from settling, when it 
otherwise should have. From the way the minute entry is written, it 
appears to the appellant that the court decided to give him one-fourth 
of his attorney's fees expended ($10,000.00) and then working backward 
from that point, attempted to explain why. 
Appellant asserts that the findings the lower court made should 
have included specific facts concerning such a substantial issue. 
Facts as described in this court's recent decision in the matter of 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 94 Utah Adv.Rpts. 3, 5 (Utah 1988) citing 
Associated Industrial Development, Inc. v. Jewkes. 701 P.2d 486 (Utah 
1984). In these cases, the court set forth "practical guidelines" for 
the determination of reasonable attorney's fees, and listed four 
factors to be considered: 
(1) what legal work was actually performed; 
(2) how much work was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter; 
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(3) if the attorneys billing rate is consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services; 
and 
(4) those additional circumstances which require consideration, 
or other additional factors which would warrant a 
modification or alteration of the fees claimed, including 
those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
Appellant believes that the court should have made findings on each of 
these important points. 
The issues contained in the second guideline referred to above 
were the most important and relevant question the court had to consider 
in deciding the attorneyfs fees question. The court made no finding 
as to how much work was reasonably necessary to prosecute the matter 
to any particular point in the litigation. Instead, the court 
obliquely states that the case probably should have settled at an early 
stage, and never answers the question as to how much work would have 
been necessary to prosecute the matter to that point. It is difficult, 
of course, to ascertain how much prosecution of the case was reasonably 
necessary when we do not know what the court found to be the point at 
which the case "probably should have settled". 
The lower court failed to make any finding about the work 
actually performed, what part of that work was necessary to prosecute 
the matter and the reasonableness of the billing rate. The court's 
concurrent failure to make any specific findings concerning the fourth 
factor outlined in the Dixie and Associated Industrial cases cited 
above, about specifically why, for what, and when appellant should have 
settled the matter at an earlier date, makes the courts findings 
20 
concerning the substantial issue of attorney's fees in this case 
inadequate. Such failure is reversible error, as is stated in Dixie 
and Associated, Therefore, the judgment concerning attorney's fees 
should be reversed and remanded to the lower court for further 
proceedings as are necessary to make an adequate finding. 
ISSUE III 
DID THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AT THE TIME OF TRIAL SUPPORT A 
DECISION BY THE COURT BELOW TO DISCOUNT THE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARD? 
The decision of the trial court below to discount the attorney's 
fees is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. All of 
the evidence on attorney's fees, even when taken in a light most 
favorable to the court, still fails to support its ruling. Therefore, 
the court's award of less than that claimed by appellant is in error. 
Before one can decide if the finding is supported, one must 
understand what the finding was. Reduced to its simplest terms, Judge 
Noel's findings were that: 
1. The case could have settled; 
2. The case probably should have settled early in the 
proceedings; 
3. The case probably should have settled when plaintiff's fees 
were $10,000.00. (The record identifies no point in time where 
plaintiff's fees were equal to this sum, but this figure is the 
••ultimate outcome" to which the court refers.) 
4. That the court was not persuaded to grant the plaintiff all 
of his attorney's fees; 
5. That the court feels an award of $10,000.00 in attorney's 
21 
fees to the plaintiff is reasonable under the circumstances. 
In its decisions in the case of Security State Bank v. 
Broadhead. 734 P.2d 469 (Utah, 1987) and Scharf v. BMG Corp. 706 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), this court has instructed that an appellant who 
claims the evidence does not support the ruling has the burden of 
reciting all of the pertinent evidence. Additionally, the appellant 
must also show that in the preponderance of the evidence taken, and in 
a light favorable to the lower court, that evidence still does not 
support the decision. In this matter, the lower court's finding on 
attorney's fees goes entirely, and inadequately, to the settlement 
issue. 
The appellant recites below virtually all of the evidence on 
attorney's fees. The summary concentrates on the pertinent evidence, 
going to the issue of whether or not the matter should have settled at 
an earlier date. 
In reviewing the summary below, please keep in mind Judge Noel's 
findings, and that: 
!• Any case can settle; 
2. Judge Noel indicated that this case probably should have 
settled early in the proceedings, but the record does not shed any 
light on when, where, why or under what circumstances; and, 
3. The record does not identify any point in time when 
plaintiff's attorney's fees were $10,000.00, or any offer to settle by 
either party,including a $10,000.00 attorney's fee component. 
Earlier in the trial, defendants had sitpulated that the 
plaintiff could be teaeted as the prevailing party for the purpose of 
22 
attorneyfs fees. The plaintiff would not have accepted the defendant's 
offer to take the car back losing his opportunity to present evidence 
of breech of contract to the jury, without the defendant's agreement 
to treat him as the prevailing party. (See Transcript of proceedings, 
pages 108-110.) 
SUMMARY OF THE RECORD CONCERNING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
After the court announced that it would grant the defendant's 
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of incidental and 
consequential damages, counsel for plaintiff indicated that respondent 
would concede that Mr. Schurtz could be treated as the prevailing party 
for the purpose of the attorney's fees issue, in return for the 
agreement stated on the record concerning the treatment of the 
revocation of acceptance issue. 
The appellant called John Baird who Jiad served earlier as 
appellant's counsel to the stand. Mr. Baird testified that he had 
formerly represented the appellant, Mr. Schurtz, and in support of an 
Exhibit identified as "Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 51" which was a summary 
of Mr. Baird's billing during the course of his representation of Mr. 
Schurtz4, Mr. Baird testified that Exhibit No. 51 was complete5 and 
that he began representing the plaintiff in the summer of 19836. Mr. 
transcript, page 110 
transcript, page 113 
transcript page 114, line 3 
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Baird further indicated that he ceased to represent him in March, 
19877. 
Mr. Baird testified that he had attended numerous depositions 
of Mr. Schurtz8 and had responded to a great deal of written discovery 
submitted by defendant as well9. Mr. Baird further testified that he 
filed the original complaint in the matter10, engaged in correspondence 
with opposing counsel, both in writing and on the telephone and 
consulted with his own client, Mr. Schurtz, to a considerable extent12 
and that he had done research in support of his client's position . 
Mr. Baird testified that an hourly summary of his work was 
included in Exhibit No. 5114 and that all of the work that had been 
performed on behalf of the appellant was necessary15. He further 
testified that a reasonable rate to be charged per hour by an attorney 
of his experience before the bench and bar (10 years) was $90.00 per 
hour16. He testified that he billed Mr. Schurtz $85.00 per hour during 
part of the period of his representation of him, and $90.00 per hour 
during the later part of his representation, all of which was reflected 
17 
in his billings and included in Exhibit No. 51 . 
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Mr. Baird testified that through the date of his testimony, Mr. 
18 
Schurtz had paid him the sum of $5,341.56 . He also testified that 
as of that date Mr. Schurtz owed him for work performed through March, 
1987, an additional $24,862.5919. 
Appellantfs counsel moved for the admission of Exhibit Nos. 51 
2 0 
and 52 into evidence. Exhibit No. 52 was admitted . After objections 
and qualifications that the evidence would be admitted for illustrative 
purposes only, Exhibit No. 51, being a detailed summary of Mr. Baird's 
21 
billings to the plaintiff, was also admitted . 
Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. McPhie, finished his examination of Mr. 
Baird on direct examination and Mr. Stevens began cross-examination. 
Some extended argument was made to the court concerning the 
applicability of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408 . After some 
discussion which consumes roughly five pages of transcript, the court 
ruled that evidence would be allowed concerning the efforts of the 
respective parties to settle, but that the court would not admit 
information containing specific amounts of money offered in 
23 
settlement. 
On cross-examination subsequent to the Rule 408 question, Mr. 
Baird testified that his billings showed that the appellant had been 
billed for a discussion of settlement on January 23rd, 198524. Mr. 
Baird further testified that the complaint in this matter was first transcript, page 116, line 23 
transcript, page 117, line 1 
transcript, page 117, line 24 
transcript, page 120, line 4 
transcript, page 127, line 19 
transcript, page 127, line 18 
transcript, page 127, line 21 
18 
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24 
25 
filed in federal court and later re-filed in the state court after 
plaintiff entered into a stipulation for dismissal in the federal court 
25 
based on jurisdictional defects . 
On cross-examination, Mr. Baird continued to testify that he 
remembered a conversation with opposing counsel early in the case, 
either just before or just after filing in state court, concerning 
settlement.26 Mr. Baird was asked by counsel for defendant if he 
remembered and early conversation made just after the complaint had 
been refiled in the state court. He was asked if whether he would 
characterize that discussion as a recision-based offer of settlement. 
Mr. Baird responded that he remembered the call, remembered Mr. Stevens 
coming to his office and remembered that Mr. Stevens expressed the 
possibility of a willingness on the part of his client to entertain an 
offer of settlement. Mr. Baird testified that there was a discussion 
concerning revocation of acceptance, the expenses of maintaining the 
28 
automobile and attorney's fees incurred by the appellant. ° Mr. Baird 
further stated that he remembered specifically a discussion of the 
plaintiff's costs to that point, his consequential damages and his 
29 
attorney's fees. Mr. Stevens then asked him again on cross-
examination if he remembered respondent making a specific, recision-
based offer,30 and Mr. Baird testified that he did not remember such 
an offer being made. Mr. Baird went on to testify that he remembered 
transcript, page 128, lines 4-16 
transcript, page 128, line 20 
transcript, page 129, line 4 
transcript, page 129, line 9 
transcript, page 130, page 4 
transcript, page 130, line 13 
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the discussion of the possibility of an offer being made by respondent, 
32 
but had no recollection of an offer being made. 
Mr. Stevens then questioned Mr. Baird as to whether or not the 
appellant had, during the course of his representation of him, ever 
33 
been made a specific recision-based offer. Mr. Baird responded and 
said "yes" and indicated that later in the proceedings there was a 
^ A 
written settlement offer made, and Mr. Stevens asked which dates that 
3 R 
offer was made. Mr. Baird responded that it was contained in 
36 
correspondence from the defendants dated August 22nd, 1986. Mr. 
Baird testified that he later received a letter from defendants 
explaining that they had not intended the August 22nd correspondence 
to be an offer, and that defendant's counsel did not have the authority 
to settle. 
Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. Baird whether there had been any 
settlement discussion between appellant and respondent between the 
first settlement discussion he identified and the correspondence of 
37 
August, 1986. Mr. Baird initially indicated that he showed some 
discussion of settlement of January 24th, 1985, but later clarified 
38 
that it was a discussion with his own client. Mr. Stevens then asked 
Mr. Baird if any of his records showed any settlement discussions in 
39 
January of 1986 , and Mr. Baird responded by indicating that his transcript, page 130, line 18 transcript, page 130, line 21 
transcript, page 130, line 23 
transcript, page 131, line 3 
transcript, page 131, line 7 
transcript,page 131, line 11 
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billing records showed no settlement discussions at that time. ° Mr. 
Stevens then asked if the billing records showed any settlement efforts 
on or about March 31st, 1986,41 and Mr. Baird indicated that his 
records did not show that, but that in a discussion with his own 
client, some settlement figures were prepared on March 3rd, 1986. Mr. 
Baird further guessed that some settlement discussion with opposing 
counsel was probably held in connection with the March 3rd work-up of 
A. O 
figures with his client. 
Mr. Stevens then directed Mr. Bairdfs attention to the July 
29th, 1986 billing statement (Exhibit No. 51) . Mr. Baird indicated 
that that billing statement showed an entry for negotiations with 
opposing counsel for settlement. Mr. Stevens then asked if there 
were settlement negotiations on August 18th, 1986 again, and Mr. 
Baird indicated that there were, by letter.45 Mr. Stevens asked if his 
records showed any settlement discussions on September 9th, 1986, and 
Mr. Baird indicated that his records showed a telephone call about 
settlement. 
Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. Baird to direct his attention to his 
February, 1987 entry in the billing record (Exhibit No. 51)48, 
whereupon Mr. Baird read the entry from his billing of that date.49 
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Mr. Bairdfs recitation was as follows: 
"The entry reads 'prepare settlement negotiations 
with opposing counsel; preparation of letter of 
confirmation; telephone call to the Supreme Court; 
review of settlement letters; telephone call to 
Scott Young1 who is your associate fdictate follow-
up letter; hand deliver letter to Scott Young and 
Pat Casey; cancel court reporter1". 
Mr. Stevens then asked if the February 18th letter referred to a letter 
of confirmation and Mr. Baird stated that it did. Mr. Stevens 
52 
asked what the letter was and Mr. Baird responded that it was a 
letter in regard to a written offer of settlement. 
Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. Baird if the complaint filed in the 
matter had contained multiple causes of action. Mr. Baird answered 
. . 54 
that the complaint contained six causes of action. Mr. Stevens then 
. 55 
asked if the complaint contained counts for fraud. Mr. Baird 
answered in the affirmative. Mr. Stevens then asked if the fraud 
count had survived. Mr. Baird answered that they had been dismissed 
58 
to the best of his recollection. Mr. Stevens then asked if the 
complaint had asked for punitive damages. Mr. Baird testified that 
it had. Mr. Stevens then asked if the request for punitive damages 
- transcript, page 137, line 2 
- transcript, page 137, line 5 
- transcript, page 137, line 8 
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had survived**1 and Mr. Baird explained that the punitive damages were 
the remedies requested based on the fraud cause of action and that when 
the fraud cause was dismissed, the request for punitive damages was 
62 
dismissed with them. 
Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. Baird if Mr. Schurtz had always 
wanted a settlement which included more than simple recision of the 
contract. Mr. Baird then answered the question, stating that Mr. 
Stevens1 statement was accurate. Counsel then asked Mr. Baird if Mr. 
63 
Schurtz had wanted punitive damages. Mr. Baird responded that Mr. 
Schurtz believed that there had been a fraud committed against him, 
that punitive damages were the appropriate remedy for fraud, and that 
they had been requested. 
Mr. Baird was then taken on re-direct examination by Mr. McPhie 
and asked if the settlement discussions with respondents counsel about 
which he had previously testified had had specific dollar amounts 
included. Mr. Baird responded that dollar amounts had been 
discussed, but that for the bulk of the conversations, dollars amounts 
were upon categories of damages and not specific offers or counter-
offers to settle. He continued to indicate that on occasion when it 
appeared possible to both sides that settlement could take place, 
specific amounts were offered back and forth. Mr. Baird was then 
asked by counsel how many times respondent offered the plaintiff a 
specific dollar amount settlement package, either orally or in writing, 
transcript, page 142, line 6 
transcript, page 142, line 7 
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30 
made with the authority to settle and which could have been accepted. 
Mr. Stevens objected to the question as being compound, and the court 
overruled. Mr. Baird then answered the question, indicating that he 
67 
did not recall any instance. Appellantfs counsel then asked Mr. 
Baird how it was that dollar amounts had been discussed, and yet no 
68 
offer had been conveyed which could have been accepted. Mr. Baird 
69 
responded as follows: 
"The spirit of it was that in fact both sides 
were interested in settling, but the 
discussions were again — for the most part 
never dealt with specific offers or counter 
offers from either side. We were attempting 
to settle the case from the outset. And I 
believe that BMW was interest in settling the 
case from the outset. I believe that because 
of the communications that were made to me from 
opposing counsel at that time, we were 
interested. We were taking initiative to 
attempt to settle the case as well. Most of 
the discussions centered on actual amounts that 
would be acceptable to the parties in terms of 
how damages would breakdown, fees incurred, 
etc. 
I never did have the understanding that we were 
dealing with anything that opposing counsel had 
authority from his client to — a specific 
amount that his client had offered, authorized 
him to offer in settlement of the case. 
And at one point I believe that I did have that 
understanding and expressed my concern, when 
in fact it did not occur and subsequently 
received — expressed my concern to opposing 
counsel, and then received a letter clarifying 
the issue that, no, he did not communicate to 
me that he had authority from his client to 
settle the case, and that he did not, but he 
was pursuing the possibility of settlement.11 
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The court then asked when that was.70 Mr. Baird responded that it was 
the letter he had previously identified from the billings as being a 
written correspondence concerning settlement, dated August 22nd, 
1986.71 The letter of August 22nd, 1986, described by Mr. Baird in his 
testimony was then marked as Exhibit No. 62 and shown to Mr. Baird for 
identification, which he did identify.72 
Mr. Baird was then asked on re-direct if lie believed that the 
allegations contained in the complaint filed on behalf of his client 
in the state court were plead in good faith. Mr. Baird responded 
that he did.74 Appellantfs counsel then asked Mr. Baird if the 
appellant had believed, in good faith, that he had good causes of 
action against the defendant which were outlined in the complaint75 
76 
and Mr. Baird responded "yes". Mr. Baird was further asked if he 
believed that the causes of action which were pled in the complaint 
. 77 
were pled in good faith, to which he responded "yes11. 
Appellant's counsel then asked Mr. Baird: 
11
 You have indicated that Mr. Schurtz wanted, 
throughout this matter, a recovery that went 
beyond purely return of the vehicle and the 
refund of his .purchase price. What in addition 
did he want?"78 
Mr. Baird replied: 
"The relief that was prayed for involved 
7 0
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[compensatory] damages for the expenses of 
keeping the car, following his effort to have 
it repaired. There was a loan that was 
involved. There were payments and interest 
expenses involved with respect to that loan 
that financed the car. There were attorney's 
fees accruing and ensuing, together with the 
punitive .damages. The car costs were 
involved."79 
Appellant then moved for admission of Exhibit No. 62 and it was, 
80 
over the objection of the respondent, received. 
Mr. Stevens then took Mr. Baird on re-cross examination, asking 
if he had intended his testimony to be as it was, that being to the 
effect that no offer of settlement specific enough or with authority 
81 
to settle had been offered the appellant. Mr. Baird answered that 
the short answer to the question was "no", and that there had been no 
offer made by the respondent which he felt was specific enough and was 
with the authority to be accepted, other than the one made August 22nd, 
82 
1986 by letter. Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. Baird if he had 
recommended to Mr. Schurtz that he accept the settlement offer 
83 
reflected in a letter dated February, 1987. Mr. Baird responded that 
it did not occur in that way, explaining that it was not an offer from 
respondent, BMW, which was being considered for acceptance or 
rejection, but rather, was an offer that he had believed he had the 
authority from Mr. Schurtz to make to the defendant. Mr. Stevens 
then asked if Mr. Baird had recommended that appellant make an offer 
n Q 
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within a certain range of numbers at which time an objection was 
raised. It was overruled and followed by a discussion of what Mr. 
Baird's letter stated, what his intention in preparing the letter had 
been, and concerning the frame of mind of both parties counsel at the 
time the letter was written. This testimony can be best characterized 
as confusing as to who had what authority, and who intended to make a 
86 
settlement offer and who did not. 
Mr. Stevens asked what two amounts of money were being discussed 
with regard to settlement at the time of the February, 1987 letter, 
resulting in an objection concerning specific amounts under Rule 408, 
87 
which objection was overruled. Mr. Baird then described what amounts 
were attributed to recision value and what amounts were attributable 
to settlement monies to be paid in other categories, in that February, 
88 
1987 letter. Mr. Baird was then asked if he recalled any of that 
discussion as being "background" to the settlement conversation taking 
place in February, 1987.89 Mr. Baird answered in the affirmative. Mr. 
Stevens then asked again as to specific price amount breakdowns in the 
settlement discussions that took place, giving rise to an objection by 
appellant's counsel, which objection was overruled. Mr. Stevens 
asked again concerning the February, 1987 settlement discussions and 
the specific numbers which had surfaced therein92 and Mr. Baird 
- transcript, page 156, line 17 
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responded that the settlement discussion had been of the recision value 
plus $3,000,00.93 
(This is the offer for settlement Mr. Baird earlier testified 
that he believed he had authority from his client to make, but which 
the court refused to enforce on Mr. Schurtz after a full hearing on the 
defendant's motion to enforce.)(See Addendum D.) 
Appellant's counsel, David A. McPhie, then took the stand 
94 
concerning his fees in the case. Appellant's counsel testified that 
he was admitted to practice before the Supreme Court and had been an 
attorney practicing in Salt Lake County for a period of ten years.95 
He further testified that he commenced representing the appellant in 
February, 1987, when his prior counsel, John Baird, had withdrawn96 
and that he had performed work including research in connection with 
resisting a motion by respondent's for enforcement of a settlement 
agreement (the February, 1987 agreement), including drafting and re-
97 
drafting memoranda of points and authorities. Appellant's counsel 
went on to testify that he appeared a second time with regard to the 
enforcement hearing on objections to prepared orders, had conferences 
both with the client and opposing counsel, had done research on the 
Magnuson-Moss Act and the Uniform Commercial Code generally and review 
of the appellant's ability to recover under the causes of action then 
98 
remaining before the court. Mr. McPhie additionally testified that 
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he had spent considerable time reviewing the depositions of Mr. Schurtz 
which were in four volumes and taken over a period of three days and 
reviewing all other discovery done, including interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents. Additionally, counsel testified 
that he had reviewed all of the correspondence and other pleadings in 
the matter. 
Counsel went on to testify that he had prepared a motion for a 
protective order with regard to respondent's third set of 
interrogatories; had done research, prepared for, and successfully 
resisted a motion by the respondent's to deny the appellant a jury 
trial; and, had additionally prepared for trial by interviewing 
witnesses, preparing direct and cross-examination of anticipated 
witnesses, compiling the documents to be presented to the court, and 
appearing at trial. 
Mr. McPhie further testified that he had expended between 155 
and 200 hours between himself and another attorney named Paul Palmer, 
who had done work in the case as a clerk in preparing the trial brief 
and preparing jury instructions, and that Mr. Palmer's work had been 
billed at the rate of $50.00 per hour. Counsel testified that his 
billing rate was $90.00 per hour and that it was a reasonable rate for 
an attorney of his experience in this community.102 Appellant's 
counsel testified concerning Exhibit No. 60, which he identified, and 
indicated that the appellant had paid to him in attorney's fees the sum 
of $9,000.00 prior to Exhibit No. 60 being compiled, and another 
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$2,000.00 subsequent to Exhibit No. 60 being compiled. He further 
testified that in addition to the $11,000.00 paid by appellant, an 
additional $1,065.00 was owing the clerk, Paul Palmer, and an 
additional $1,800.00 for two days of trial, which were not included in 
the billing.104 
Mr. McPhie was then cross-examined by Mr. Stevens who reviewed 
with him all discussions of settlement referred to in Exhibit No. 60105 
and asked if the billings showed any conference regarding settlement 
on October 1st, 1987, to which Mr. McPhie responded "yes".1 6 Mr. 
Stevens asked if there was an indication of a conference regarding 
settlement on September 2nd, 1987 and Mr. McPhie responded in the 
107 
affirmative. Mr. Stevens asked appellants counsel about October 
16th, 1987 as to a settlement discussion and counsel testified that 
there was. Mr. Stevens went on to ask if appellant's counsel had 
prepared a settlement offer. Mr. McPhie responded that he had mailed 
a settlement proposal in the form of a letter about that time. Mr. 
Stevens asked Mr. McPhie concerning his billing of April 1st, 1988, and 
whether or not it referred to a March 10th billing discussing a 
settlement conference with "Young", to which appellant's counsel 
indicated he saw such an indication in the billing statement.109 Mr. 
Stevens then asked if there was a billing in the appellant's billing 
statement for July 19th, 1988 to which appellant's counsel responded 
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ffYes, I remember that occasion specifically."110 Mr. Stevens then 
asked Mr. McPhie if he remembered speaking about settlement 
specifically on that occasion and Mr. McPhie responded in the 
affirmative. Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. McPhie if he remembered a 
discussion on approximately July 7th, 1988. Mr. McPhie again affirmed 
that there was an entry in his billing record which showed "preparation 
for a settlement conference with defendant's counsel". 
Mr. Stevens then asked if, in any of the settlement discussions 
between himself and the witness, Mr. McPhie, whether an offer had been 
made on behalf of appellant for settlement, based on recision alone, 
or whether the settlement offers were made based on some recompense for 
112 
additional damages appellant had alleged. Mr. McPhiefs response 
was: 
"In all of our — let me answer your question 
directly first. Our discussions in the month 
of July, 1988, as referred to, were discussions 
in which I indicated to you that I believed my 
client might settle, and that I anticipated 
some difficulty in selling him on the 
proposition for certain amounts of money. And 
that those amounts of money, the totals were 
made up of amounts for revocation, minus a fair 
amount of money to compensate BMW for miles 
against the purchase price and return, and for 
incidental and consequential damages we 
believed plaintiff was entitled to recover, and 
a component for attorney's fees. And I, as I 
recall, it was soliciting from BMW an offer and 
response to my statements concerning what I 
believed my client would take without 
discussing it with him." 
Respondent's counsel then asked if every offer made by appellant 
through his then counsel, McPhie, had included a component requesting 
1 1 0
 - transcript, page 168, line 18 
1
 - transcript, page 169, line 7 
112 
- transcript, page 169, line 20 
38 
amounts of money for incidental and consequential damages and 
attorney's fees, beyond the price agreed to for the revocation, and 
113 
appellant's counsel agreed that was correct. 
Mr. Stevens then indicated that he had no further questions for 
Mr. McPhie on cross, whereupon, Mr. McPhie testified as follows: 
"I would like to indicate that in the 
references to the dates on which billings were 
made for settlement discussions, there have 
only been two to three real settlement 
discussions of substance, in my view. 
Shortly after the time this court denied the 
motion for enforcement of what was a previous 
settlement agreement, there was an exploration 
as to whether this matter could be settled 
without having to gear back up for an 
anticipated trial. 
It was clear from those discussions that the 
defendants would not or could not offer any 
amount of money which would substantially 
reimburse Mr. Schurtz for his attorney's fees. 
And therefore settlement negotiations, I 
believe, were thought on both sides to be at 
an impasse. 
The intervening conversations before July of 
this year were casual references to a general 
desire to settle this matter, and no specifics 
were discussed. The only other settlement 
discussions of substance have been in July, 
last month, as both sides prepared for trial. 
And again, settlement negotiations have broken 
down when we have pursued the recovery of what 
Mr. Schurtz believed he should have gotten in 
incidental and consequential damages and 
attorney's fees."114 
On re-cross, Mr. Stevens asked Mr. McPhie if the settlement 
offer made by plaintiff shortly after the court's ruling to not enforce 
a previous settlement agreement had been in the $80,000.00 range. Mr. 
113 
XA
 - transcript, page 170, line 18 
1 1 4
 - transcript, page 172, line 1 
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McPhie indicated that he could not remember, but that such a figure 
would not surprise him.115 Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. McPhie if 
settlement discussions shortly before trial were to the effect that the 
appellant still wanted many multiples of the recision value of the car 
in full settlement for revocation, incidental and consequential damages 
and attorneys fees, to which appellant's counsel replied "yes11.116 
Appellant's counsel then offered Exhibit No. 60 of Mr. McPhie1s 
detailed listing concerning billing, into evidence, and opposing 
counsel offered no objection. 
[END OF EVIDENCE SUMMARY] 
Hugh Schurtz was entitled to his attorney's fees. Magnuson-Moss 
provides fees to the prevailing party under §15 USC 2310(d)(2), and it 
had been stipulated that the plaintiff was the prevailing party. Mr. 
Schurtz's evidence as to fees was straight-forward and to the point. 
Both of plaintiff's counsel testified as to the time spent, the 
necessity of the time spent, and a reasonable billing rate for that 
time. The unchallenged testimony was that plaintiff, in good faith, 
pursued causes of action in which he believed. 
The defendants never admitted breech of warranty and the jury 
was released without making a finding. It was obvious that the 
defendants believed a jury would find breech of warranty, or they would 
not have allowed the car to be returned for the purchase price, or 
agreed to allow the plaintiff to be treated as the prevailing party 
- transcript, page 173, line 16 
- transcript, page 174,line 15 
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for the purpose of attorney's fees. The defendants avoided the 
evidence which would have shown that the plaintiff suffered from their 
breech of warranty and its effects, through defendants offer to take 
the car back and designate plaintiff as the prevailing party. 
When the plaintiff was forced to sue to obtain relief, he 
brought his suit under the provisions of, and sought the relief 
provided for, under Magnuson-Moss. Those remedies include the right 
to return the car and get back the purchase price (minus a fair amount 
to compensate for actual miles driven), incidental and consequential 
damages, and reasonable attorney's fees actually incurred. 
The record outlined above shows no time, place or event where 
the plaintiff had a chance to settle for what he believed were his just 
damages and fees, or for a sum even close to those damages and fees. 
The defendant called no witnesses. There was no testimony explaining 
what offer Mr. Schurtz should have accepted, or why. It was simply the 
position of the defendants, that they had not breeched the warranty 
(although they conceded the remedy for the breech) and that Mr. Schurtz 
did not need the Magnuson-Moss remedies he prayed for and should have 
settled early in the case for little, if anything, in the way of 
incidental damages or fees. Again, this came from the defendants who 
obviously agreed to a return of the vehicle and treating plaintiff as 
the prevailing party, in order to avoid the continuing, damaging 
testimony concerning breech of warranty. The defendant never offered 
anything for incidental and consequential damages. The only offer on 
which this court has any specific information was the one made in 
February of 1987. (See Transcript of Proceedings, page 117.) It 
contained a $3,000.00 component for attorney's fees. (Transcript, page 
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118) The plaintiff's fees by that time were more than $20,000.00. 
(Transcript, page 119.) In a later ruling the lower court refused to 
enforce that settlement on the plaintiff. (See Addendum D.) 
The relationship of the attorney's fees to the amount in 
controversy is also not a limiting factor. Other courts have permitted 
generous awards of attorney's fees in Magnuson-Moss cases. Universal 
Motors, Inc. v. Waldock, 719 P.2d 254 (Alaska 1986) (award of attorney's 
fees of $36,526 where damage award was $20,000); Duval v. Midwest Auto 
City, Inc., 578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1978)(attorney's fees in excess of 
$14,000 awarded where damages amounted to only $3,960). This court has 
taken a similar posture that an award of attorney's fees can be greater 
than the amount recovered and still be reasonable. Cabrera v. Cohrell, 
694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). 
The only asserted basis for reduction of attorney's fees is the 
unsupported conclusion by the trial court that the matter "could have 
and probably should have" been settled earlier. No evidence was 
presented showing why plaintiff should have settled for less than the 
value of his claim. No evidence was presented that appellant was, 
either based upon fact or law, unreasonable in pursuing the full value 
of his claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court below committed an error of law in granting 
partial summary judgment against the plaintiff on the issue of 
incidental and consequential damages. 
The findings made by Judge Noel are inadequate to support his 
decision to award plaintiff a reduced amount in attorney's fees. 
The record made at trial concerning attorney's fees and 
settlement attempts, taken in a light most favorable to the lower 
court, still does not support its findings concerning plaintiff's fees. 
Hugh Schurtz, the plaintiff below and the appellant herein, 
requests that this court reverse the judgment of the lower court and 
remand the matter for trial on the issue of the amount of incidental 
and consequential damages to be awarded him. Appellant also requests 
that this court reverse the lower court's order concerning attorney's 
fees, and award him the attorney's fees requested at trial in the 
amount of $44,069.15. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^  day of March, 1989. 
l X <^ A. A^>L 
David A. McPhie 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing to attorney for defendants, Lewis T. Stevens, at 215 S. 
State Street, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, 
on this
 <j%<? day of March, 1989, 
David A. 
A.A£&. 
McPhie 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I DAVID A. McPHIE, #2216 || HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE 
i  Attorney for Plaintiff 
!! 3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301 
j! Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
\[ Telephone: 484-7632 
i| IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
I IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
! HUGH SCHURTZ, ) 
} ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
jf Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I v* • )' 
) Civil NO. C84-7463 
J BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., ) 
CLARK BUICK-DATSUN-GMC-BMW, ) Judge Frank G. Noel 
I INC., BMW OF MURRAY, and DOES ) 
1 through X, ) 
Defendants. ) 
THIS MATTER came on for trial on the 1st day of August, i 
j i 
1988 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. before the Honorable Judge Frank j 
G. Noel. ! 
The plaintiff appeared personally and through his attorney j 
of record, David A. McPhie. The defendants appeared by and 
through their attorney of record, Lewis T. Stevens. I 
A jury panel was interviewed and examined for cause and I 
pre-emptry challenges were made. A jury was impaneled and sworn 
in to serve as a jury in the case. j 
Counsel made their opening statements, and the plaintiff 
called his first witness, Hugh Schurtz, who was examined on 
direct examination and who identified various pieces of physical 
evidence in the form of documents, many of which were admitted i 
into evidence. I 
J Prior to the date of trial, defendants had made a motion j 
for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for partial summary 
j| judgment, requesting that all defendants warranty theories be 
j| summarily dismissed, or in the alternative, that the plaintiff be 
j! summarily denied incidental and consequential damages. This 
jj motion for full or partial summary judgment had been heard on 
July 22nd, 1988 at 10:00 a.m. and was taken and held under 
advisement by the court. 
I On the morning of the second day of trial, the court • 
I 
called counsel into chambers and indicated that it denied j 
defendants motion for summary judgment eliminating plaintifffs | 
i 
i 
causes of action based on warranty, but granted defendants j 
i 
motion to eliminate plaintifffs right to incidental and ! 
! 
consequential damages. The court's decision was stated in open 
court and on the record immediately thereafter. j 
In connection with said decision by the court, certain i 
i 
j stipulations were made by the parties on the record in open j 
|court. These stipulations were that: 
A. Although defendant did not concede the issues of 
breach of warranty or breach of contract, a stipulation was 
entered into to the effect that defendant would allow plaintiff 
to return the subject vehicle to defendant, and that the purchase 
price of $14,500.00 of the vehicle would be refunded to 
plaintiff, minus a credit to the defendant for actual use by the 
plaintiff in the amount of $0.16 per mile for 22,516 miles, for a 
total credit of $3,602.56; and 
B. It was further stipulated that for purposes of the 
attorney's fees argument, that plaintiff would be deemed the 
prevailing party as is referred to in Section 15 U.S.C. 2310 of 
li the United States Code, which is the attorney's fees provision of 
the Manguson-Moss Warranty Act. 
Having further decided, sua sponte, that the provisions of 
Section 15 U.S.C. 2310 of the United States Code anticipates the 
attorney's fees question in a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Case being 
decided by the court, and not a jury, and all other jury issues 
having been disposed of either by stipulation or by summary 
judgment, the court dismissed the jury. 
Plaintiff then called witnesses in support of plaintiff's 
attorney's fees, namely, John Baird and David A. McPhie, who were 
examined by counsel for both parties on direct, cross, re-direct 
and re-cross. 
Closing argument was made, and the court took the matter 
of the issue of attorney's fees of plaintiff, the only remaining 
issue, under advisement. 
The court later published its opinion concerning the 
attorney's fees issue, via minute entry dated August 9th, 1988. 
Based upon the partial summary judgment granted 
defendants, dismissing plaintiff's claim for incidental and 
consequential damages, and the stipulation of the parties 
concerning return of the motor vehicle to the defendants and the 
refund of the purchase price, minus $0.16 per mile for miles 
driven, and the court's decision as contained in its minute entry 
concerning attorney's fees, the court now makes the following 
il FINDINGS OF FACT 
!i. . • • 
a 
•j 1. The court finds that the purchase price of the motor , 
ii j 
I vehicle was $14,500.00. I 
i 
|l 2. The court finds that the plaintiff drove the car 
22,516 miles. 
3. The court further finds, based upon the stipulation 
of the parties, that a reasonable amount to award defendant in j 
i 
credit for miles driven on the vehicle is the amount of $0.16 per j 
( 
mile. J 
4. The court finds, with regard to attorney^ fees, that 
this matter could have been, and probably should have been, j 
settled very early in the proceedings, for an amount roughly j 
i 
equal to the ultimate outcome. The court further finds that a j 
substantial discount of the plaintifffs attorneyfs fees is ! 
appropriate. The court further finds that a reasonable amount in 
attorney's fees to be awarded plaintiff under the circumstances 
is the amount of $10,000.00. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court now 
makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff should be awarded judgment against 
defendant in the amount of $10,897.44, and is ordered to return 
the 1982 BMW model 320i motor vehicle, which is the subject of 
this lawsuit, to the defendants in connection with the payment to 
l 
Ij plaintiff of said amount by defendant. 
ji 
ij 2. Plaintiff should not be awarded, nor be entitled to ; 
present evidence in support of, his claim for incidental and j 
consequential damages for breach of the warranty and/or contract | 
of sale as is prayed for in the complaint. j 
3. Plaintiff 6hould be awarded an additional judgment 
against defendants in the amount of $10,000.00 for attorneyfs j 
fees. ! 
DATED this J?£> day of September, 1988. j 
Approved: 
Lewis jr. Stevens 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid, on this ^ >* day 
of August, 1988. 
Lewis T. Stevens T. Patrick Casey 
Atty for BMW Attorney for Clark 
215 S. State St., #500 r 185 S. State St., #700 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 1 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
£<£ Deborah M. >P£1 ton, Secretary 
DAVID A. McPHIE, #2216 i 
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE j 
Attorney for Plaintiff ! 
3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301 j 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 484-7632 j 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HUGH SCHURTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., 
CLARK BUICK-DATSUN-GMC-BMW, 
INC., BMW OF MURRAY, and DOES 
through X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C84-7463 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
THIS MATTER came on for trial on the 1st day of August, ! 
1988 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. before the Honorable Judge Frank j 
G. Noel. ! 
i 
The plaintiff appeared personally and through his attorney 
of record, David A. McPhie. The defendants appeared by and 
through their attorney of record# Lewis T. Stevens. 
A jury panel was interviewed and examined for cause and 
pre-emptry challenges were made. A jury was impaneled and sworn 
in to serve as the jury in the case. 
Counsel made their opening statements, and the plaintiff 
called his first witness, Hugh Schurtz, who was examined on 
direct examination and who identified various pieces of physical 
evidence in the form of documents, many of which were admitted 
into evidence. 
Prior to the date of trial, defendants made a motion for 
summary judgment, or in the alternative, for partial summary 
j  judgment, requesting that all defendants warranty theories be 
;' summarily dismissed, or in the alternative, that the plaintiff be j 
:, summarily denied incidental and consequential damages. This 
i . 
motion for full or partial summary judgment had been heard on 
July 22nd, 1988 at 10:00 a.m. and was taken and held under 
advisement by the court. 
On the morning of the second day of trial, the court 
j called counsel into chambers and indicated that it denied 
I defendants motion for summary judgment eliminating plaintiff!s 
i causes of action based on warranty, but granted defendants 
j motion to eliminate plaintiff fs right to incidental and 
;j consequential damages. The courtfs decision was stated in open 
court and on the record immediately thereafter. 
In connection with said decision by the court, certain 
stipulations were made by the parties on the record in open 
court. These stipulations were that: 
A. Although defendant did not concede the issues of 
breach of warranty or breach of contract, a stipulation was 
entered into to the effect that defendant would allow plaintiff 
to return the subject motor vehicle to defendant, and that the 
purchase price of $14,500.00 of the vehicle would be refunded to 
plaintiff, minus a credit to the defendant for actual use by the 
plaintiff in the amount of $0.16 per mile for 22,516 miles, for a 
total credit of $3,602.56; and 
B. It was further stipulated that for purposes of the 
attorneyfs fees argument, that plaintiff would be deemed the 
j prevailing party as is referred to in Section 15 U.S.C. 2310, of 
i the United States Code, which is the attorneyfs fees provision of 
| the Manguson-Moss Warranty Act. 
Having further decided, sua sponte, that the provisions of 
Section 15 U.S.C. 2310 of the United States Code anticipates the 
attorney's fees question in a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Case being 
decided by the court and not a jury, and all other jury issues 
having been disposed of either by stipulation or by summary 
judgment, the court dismissed the jury. 
Plaintiff then called witnesses in support of plaintiff's 
attorney's fees, namely, John Baird and David A. McPhie, who were 
examined by counsel for both parties on direct, cross, re-direct 
and re-cross. 
Closing argument was made, and the court took the matter 
of the issue of attorney's fees of plaintiff, the only remaining 
issue, under advisement. 
The court later published its opinion concerning the 
attorney's fees issue, via minute entry dated August 9th, 1988. 
Based upon the partial summary judgment granted 
defendants, dismissing plaintiff's claim for incidental and 
consequential damages, and the stipulation of the parties 
concerning return of the motor vehicle to the defendants and the 
refund of the purchase price, minus $0.16 per mile for miles 
driven, and the court's decision as contained in its minute entry 
concerning attorney's fees, and the court having previously 
published its findings of fact and conclusions of law# now makes 
the following order and judgment• j 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: j 
1. The plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against the ; 
defendants, and each of them, in the amount of $10,897.44. ' 
2. Plaintiff is ordered to return the subject motor I 
vehicle, a 1982 BMW model 320i, to the defendant via such agent [ 
i 
as defendant may direct, and that 6aid return of the vehicle by j 
plaintiff to defendants and payment of the judgment referred to ! 
immediately above from defendant to plaintiff shall occur I 
simultaneously. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded further judgment against j 
i 
defendants in the amount of $10,000.00 in attorneyfs fees. ! 
& ' 
DATED this ^ u d a y of September, 1988. i 
i 
i 
Approved: 
trudge/?: rank G. Noel 
Lewis' T-i Stevens 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING | 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of j 
the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid, on this J2>£day ! 
of August, 1988. i 
Lewis T. Stevens T. Patrick Casey 
Atty for BMW Attorney for Clark 
215 S. State St., #500 185 S. State St., #700 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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BMW LIMITED WARRANTY 
LIMITED WARRANTY 
1982 MODELS 
(Valid only in the U.S.A.) 
BMW of North America, Inc. warrants this vehicle to be free of 
defects In materials or workmanship for a period of 3 years or 
36.000 miles, whichever occurs first, commencing with the 
date the vehicle is first licensed or placed In service as a 
"demonstrator" or -company car**. To obtain service under 
this warranty, the vehicle must be brought, upon discovery 
of the defect, to The workshop of any authorised BMW dealer. 
This dealer will, without charge for parts or labor either repair 
or replace the defective part(s). The decision to repair or 
replace said part(s) being wholly the responsibility of BMW 
of North America. Inc. Parts for which replacements are 
made become the property of BMW of North America. Inc. 
BMW of North America. Inc. makes no other express warranty 
on this product except the warranty as to the emission 
control system or the Limited Warranty - Rust Perforation. 
THE DURATION OF ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING 
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY. IS 
LIMITED TO THE DURATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTY 
HEREIN. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC HEREBY EX-
CLUDES INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, 
INCLUDING LOSS OF TIME, INCONVENIENCE, OR LOSS 
OF USE OF THE VEHICLE, FOR ANY BREACH OF ANY 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY, INCLUOING THE 
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, APPLICABLE 
TO THIS PRODUCT. Some states do not allow limitations 
on how long an implied warranty lasts, or the exclusion or 
limitation of incidental or consequential damages, so the 
above limitations and exclusions may not apply to you. 
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may also 
have other rights which vary from state to state. Any legal 
claim or actfon arising from any express or implied warranty 
contained herein must be brought within 12 months of the 
date it arises. 
THE WARRANTY SHALL BE NULL AND VOID IF: 
The vehicle is used in any competitive events. 
THIS WARRANTY DOES NOT APPLY TO 
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: 
a. Maintenance services, oil changes, and filters 
b. Incandescent bulbs and fuses 
c. Wheel alignment and balancing 
d. Brake linings and brake pads 
e. Windshield wiper blades 
f. V-belts 
g. Mechanical adjustments or repairs which become necessary 
through normal use. or wear and tear 
h. Towing 
f. Damage attributable to negligence. Improper treatment, or 
treatment contrary to the "Owner's Handbook", 
j . Damage occurring through corrosion resulting from road salt, 
or Improper accident damage repairs, 
k. Damage to a component or assembly due to the Installation 
of replacement parts with specifications that differ In any 
material respect from genuine BMW parts. 
1. Damage attributable to failure to perform maintenance 
services at the specified Intervals or In accordance with the 
instructions In the "Owner's Manual". Proof must be provided 
either by a paid invoice copy or filling In the appropriate 
boxes In the service manual. 
H m. Tires have a separate limited warranty from their respective 
™ manufacturer. 
n. Any vehicle on which the odometer has been replaced or 
altered, and the true mileage cannot be determined. 
EASTERN REGIONAL OFFICE 
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA. INC. 
WALNUT STREET 4 HUDSON AVENUE 
NORWOOD. NEW JERSEY 07S4S 
WESTERN REGIONAL OFFICE 
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA. INC. 
12541 BEATRICE AVENUE 
F.O. BOX M91S .
 r - . 
LIMITED WARRANTY - RUST PERFORATION - 1962 MODELS 
BMW of North America. Inc.. warrants this vehicle to be free 
of defects in materials or workmanship which will result ftn 
rust perforation of the vehicle body for a period of 6 years, 
without mileage limitation, commencing wtth the date the 
vehicle Is first licensed or placed In service as a -demonstrator" 
or "company car." 
To obtain service under this warranty, the vehicle must be 
brought, upon discovery of any rust perforation, to the work-
shop of any authorized BMW dealer. This dealer win, wttrxxrt 
charge for parts or labor either tepak or replace the defective 
part(s). The decision to repair or replace said partes) being 
wholly the responsibility of BMW of North America, Inc. 
Parts for which replacements are made become the property 
of BMW of North America. Inc. 
BMW of North America, Inc.. makes no other express 
warranty on this product except the new car warranty or 
the warranty as to the emission control system. THE OURATION 
OF ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED 
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, IS LIMITED TO THE 
DURATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTY HEREIN. BMW OF 
NORTH AMERICA, INC, HEREBY EXCLUDES INCIDENTAL 
ANO CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUOING LOSS OF 
TIME, INCONVENIENCE, OR LOSS OF USE OF THE 
VEHICLE. FOR ANY BREACH OF ANY EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY 
OF MERCHANTABILITY. APPLICABLE TO THIS PRODUCT. 
Some states do not allow limitations on how long an Implied 
warranty lasts, or the exclusion or limitation of Incidental 
or consequential damages, so the above limitations and 
exclusions may not apply to you. 
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may I 
also have other rights which vary from state to state. Any 
legal claim or action arising from any express or Implied 
warranty contained herein must be brought within 12 months 
of the date it arises. 
THIS WARRANTY DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FOLLOWING: j 
a. Damage caused by negligence. Improper accident damage | 
repairs, or improper use. j 
b. Damage attributable to failure to perform required In-
spections/maintenance at the specified Intervals or In ; 
accordance with the BMW rust Inspection/maintenance 
program instructions. Proof must be provided by a paid 
invoice or filling In the appropriate boxes In the Service 
Manual. 
REQUIRED MAINTENANCE: 
In order to keep this warranty In effect, the vehicle must 
be Inspected every 12th month, beginning at the end of the 
first year of service. Any areas requiring preventive maintenance 
must be repaired. (THIS INSPECTION/MAINTENANCE IS AT 
THE OWNERS EXPENSE.) 
The Inspection/Maintenance consists of: 
a. Washing the chassis, before Inspection, If necessary doe 
to dirt accumulation. 
b. Repairing any damages to undercoatlng due to stone 
chips, gravel erosion, scratches, or other external Influences. 
CENTRAL REGIONAL OFFICE 
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA. I N C . 
1003 C. ALGONQUIN ROAD 
SCMAUM6URQ, ILLINOIS §01*9 
SOUTHERN REGIONAL O f F I C E 
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA. I N C 
7300 VALLEY VIEW LANE, SUITE 900 
P.O. BOX 340330 
THE WARRANTy^ SHALCBE NULL AND VOID IF: 
the vehicle!* u^mj^^mpet l t lve events. 
THIS WARIJjAN^ APPLY TO THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: 
a. MalntedVrtcO^ and filters 
b. Incandescent'bulbs'and fuses 
c. Wheel alignment and balancing 
d. Brake linings and brake pads 
e. Windshield wiper blades 
f. V-belts 
g. Mechanical adjustments or repairs which become necessary through normal use, or wear and tear 
h. Towing 
I. Damage attributable to negligence, Improper treatment, or treatment contrary to the "owner's Handbook.9* 
J. Oamage occurring through corrosion resulting from road salt, or Improper accident damage repairs. 
k. Damage to a component or assembly due to the Installation of replacement parts with specifications that differ tftfl 
any material respect from genuine BMW parts. 
I. pamage attributable to failure to perform maintenance services at the specified Intervals or In accordance with t f i l 
structlons In the "Owner's Manual." Proof must be provided either by a paid Invoice copy or filling in the approprtfi 
boxes In the service manual, 
m. Tires have a separate limited warranty from their respective manufacturer, 
n. Any vehicle on which the odometer has been replaced or altered and the true mileage cannot be determined. 
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LIMITEl&WAftRANTY _ 1932 MODELS 
(Valid pnlytft the U.S.A.) 
BMW of North America,Tnc.,%arrants this vehicle to be free of defects In materials or workmanship for a period of 3 yearift 
36,000 miles, whichever' occurs first, commencing with the date the vehicle Is first licensed or placed in service atf 
"demonstrator" or "Company car." To obtain service under this warranty, the vehicle must be brought, upon discovery of US 
defect, to the workshop of any authorized BMW dealer. This dealer will, without charge for parts or labor either repair^ 
replace the defective part(s). The decision to repair or replace said part(s) being wholly the responsibility of BMW of Nort 
America, Inc. Parin for which replacements are made become the property of BMW of North America, Inc. - A M 
BMW of North America; Ind, makes no other express warranty on this product except the warranty as to the emission contra 
system or the Limited Warranty-Rust Perforation. THE DURATION OF ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING THE fltf 
PLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, IS LIMITED TO THE DURATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTY HEREIN. BMW6( 
NORTH AMERICA, INC., HEREBY EXCLUDES INCIDENTAL ANO CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING LOSS OF TIME 
INCONVENIENCE, OR LOSS OF USE OF THE VEHICLE, FOR ANY BREACH OF ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY, M 
CLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, APPLICABLE TO THIS PRODUCT. Some states do not alld* 
limitations on how long an Implied warranty lasts, or the exclusion or limitation of incidental or consequential damages, « 
the above limitations and exclusions may not apply to you. 
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may also have other rights which vary from state to state. Any legS 
claim or action arising from any express or Implied warranty contained herein must be brought within 12 months of the datejj 
arises. 
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VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
USWIS T. STEVENS (A3104) 
SCOTT F. YOUNG (A3890) 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1036 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BMW of North America, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
HUGH SCHURTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.; 
CLARK BUICK-DATSUN-GMOBMW, 
INC. ; BMW OF MURRAY and DOES 
I through X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS1 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Civil No. C 84-7463 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
- ooOoo 
The evidentiary hearing on defendants1 Motion for 
Enforcement of a Settlement Agreement came on regularly before 
the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge, on the 23rd day 
of April, 1987, at the hour of 8:00 a.m. The plaintiff Hugh 
Schurtz was present and was represented by his counsel of 
record, David A. McPhie, Esq., of and for Hintze, Brown, 
Faust, Blakesley & McPhie; and each of the defendants were 
represented by their counsel of record. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file 
herein, the Memoranda of the parties, having received evidence 
and exhibits, having considered the arguments of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about February 17, 1987, plaintiff's 
counsel contacted counsel for defendant BMW of North America, 
Inc. ("BMW") and stated that plaintiff was willing to settle 
all claims against all defendants for $18,000.00, with 
plaintiff returning the car to defendants and a mutual release 
by all parties. 
2. On February 18, 1987, after discussions between 
counsel for defendants and with their respective clients, 
counsel for defendant BMW contacted plaintiff's counsel and 
requested that plaintifffs offer of settlement be set forth in 
a letter. 
3. On February 18, 1987, plaintifffs counsel had 
hand delivered to counsel for defendants a letter confirming 
plaintiff's offer to settle all claims and disputes as 
outlined in a telephone conversation of February 17, 1987. 
4. Also on February 18, 1987, plaintiff's counsel 
had hand delivered to counsel for defendants a second letter 
extending the duration of plaintiff's offer from 8:00 a.m. on 
February 19, 1987, to 2:00 p.m. on February 19, 1987. 
5. On February 19, 1987, defendants had hand 
delivered to plaintiff's counsel a letter accepting 
plaintiff's offer of settlement as outlined in the two letters 
of plaintiff's counsel, both dated February 18, 1987. 
6. The acceptance letter was received by 
plaintiff's counsel prior to the expiration time of 
plaintiff's offer of 2:00 p.m. on February 19, 1987. 
7. Subsequent to receipt of the acceptance letter, 
plaintiff's counsel contacted counsel for defendants and 
stated that plaintiff had informed his counsel that plaintiff 
did not authorize plaintiff's counsel to settle the above-
captioned litigation for the sum of $18,000.00. 
8. The Court finds that the plaintiff did not 
authorize his lawyer to settle this lawsuit for the sum of 
$18,000. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
now makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. Under the laws of the State of Utah, 
authorization is required by the client before a settlement 
made by the attorney will be binding on the client. 
2. An attorney has no implied authority to settle 
his client's claim. 
3. It is the client's case, not the attorney's, 
and the courts should refuse to enforce settlement agreements 
where attorneys do not have specific authority to make the 
settlement. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion for 
Enforcement of a Settlement Agreement be, and the same hereby 
is, denied. 
!"I I!.. ill,lik"In" FURTHER ORDERED t h a t t h i s CourtT* 
nf these proceedings hef ami thp same hereby • 
withdrawn and tViri' " ' iiiirtit-. ..JiilJ l i l t r esponses t o an\ 
• , .• ,i!,*„i,., u is^uveiy w i t h i n t h i r t y (30) days froL. ~ic -u*w^ 
lereof, 
DATED this JL 7 ^ day of OrtoLei, . 
tav THE COURT: 
/ -
/ 
t p6no The honorable Frank G Noel 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
rINTZE, BROWN, FAUSTf 
BLAKESLEY & McPHIE 
uavid A McPhie 
By: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Scot t F. Young 
By: ^ W ^ , 
Attorneys 
North Ame 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Val R. Antczak^ 
T. Patrick Casey A 
By: ^ _ _ _ 
Attbmeys 'for ^ tiick-Datsun-
GMC-BMW, Inc. i BMW of 
Murray / 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS1 MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT to be mailed this 
^^ day of October, 1987, by depositing the same in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, to: 
David A. McPhie, Esq. 
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3450 South Highland Drive 
Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Val R. Antczak, Esq. 
T. Patrick Casey, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants Clark 
Buick-Datsun-GMC-BMW, INC. and 
BMW of Murray 
185 South State Street 
Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^^^f. 
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